A. Vakhtel’s article is a foreword to the translation of A. Gurwitsch’s essay entitled “On the Intentionality of Consciousness” that was initially published in 1940 in the collection of articles called Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl. In his essay, A. Gurwitsch analyzes the notion of intentionality chiefly on the basis of Husserl’s noesis-noema doctrine and Hume’s theory of perception. The main questions the author of essay seeks to answer are the following: Can we make a clear statement of the intrinsic identity, and, if yes, how can identical object exist for consciousness whose life consists in perpetual variations? According to A. Gurwitsch, these problems can be resolved only by means of the notion of intentionality, which implies the correlation between temporality and identity. The life and oeuvre of A. Gurwitsch, as well as the main prerequisites of the essay appearance are described in the beginning of the A. Vakhtel’s foreword. The review is also dedicated to nuances of the translated work and, to a certain extent, of the English-speaking philosophical tradition in general, with respect to the difficulties and suggestions in the translation of some key notions of epistemology.