Свідомий досвід та антиредукціонізм у філософії Девіда Чалмерса

In this article the five arguments against reductionism are analyzed, which Chalmers presents in his book “The Conscious Mind”. These are then generalized, and their theoretical relevance is assessed. In the first part the author draws the distinctions between the two pair of terms of Chalmers’ philosophy, namely “psychological” and “phenomenal consciousness,” “the easy problems” and “the hard problem of consciousness.” The second part is a brief survey of the five arguments for the irreducibility of consciousness. In the third part the author gives critical assessment of the arguments and counterposes them to the stronger argument of intentionality. In the fourth part Husserl’s approach is compared with that of Chalmers, especially in the context of their reductionism critique. Summing up the results of the investigation, the author puts forward a notion of phenomenal experience that is different from the one proposed by Chalmers and that is closely related with the notion of intentionality.