Трансцендентальний арґумент і проблема дедукції

Автор(и): Бубнер Рюдіґер
Тип матеріалу: Стаття
Мова публікації: українська
Мова оригіналу: англійська
Перекладач(і): Джулай Юрій
Випуск: 2009 №2
Сторінки: 106-119
Журнальна рубрикація: Онтологія і гносеологія
Abstract: 
The need to fully realize the interpretation of Kant's notion of transcendence requires crit­ical attitude to the modern debate regarding this notion between the representatives of ana­lytic philosophy (Wittgenstein, Quine, Strawson). Within analytic tradition, the notion of transcendence implies the transformation of the conditions of the possibility of logic, language, and empirical science into formal self-ref­erential structure. The authenticity of the interpretation of Kant's concept of transcendence and the tran­scendental argument is further supported by: 1) understanding the impossibility of its excessive convergence with the notion of a priori, 2) understanding of the transcendence as self-representative complex structure which includes the coordination between the con­ditions of genesis and functioning of empirical knowledge and conditions of the exclusion of intellectual alternatives on the levels of logical analysis and empirical knowledge. The space of self-referential functional values of transcendental argument is indicated by Kant quite formally. This transparent disposition of the formally coordinated system of cognitive conditions of the synthesis of knowledge and understanding have caused the insufficient acknowledgement of the self-referential character of the transcendental argument, as well as numerous attempts to return to its interpretation according to deductive reasoning.
165
Постійна адреса матеріалу
http://journal.philosophy.ua/node/7402
Як цитувати
Бубнер Рюдіґер (2009). Трансцендентальний арґумент і проблема дедукції . Пер. з англійська : Джулай Юрій . Філософська думка, №2. с. 106-119.