The problem of origins of the analytic philosophy is a subject of a profound intrinsic consideration among such contemporary thinkers as R. Monk. His key standpoint is that interpretative clue protracted by M. Dummett made it possible to discover a historic impetus for the whole “linguisticmovement” in Frege’s thought. Monk’s objection points out that the analytic philosophy was full-methodologically structured movement already defined in its strategies since the beginning. The crucial opposition between those analysts wh o declared logic as a vehicle for a metaphilosophical position and those who considered it were the final aim of its development was exposed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Although the patterns of reconsidering the method-validity problem became the point of self-identification for analysts, which then established two traditions — logical and linguistic analysis — instead of the former one, the real core within this tradition was not “the linguistic turn” but, namely, the variety of possibilities of the analysis. The author’s opinion is that a devising of any kind of tradition is a way to sum up and outline its perspectives; hereby it needs such a rewriting which would productively include each of alternatives into assessment of its own historic self-reflections.