Трансцендентальна феноменологія і поняття досвіду
Should we characterize Husserl’s phenomenology as a philosophy of experience – transcendental empiricism? Could a title of “phenomenology of experience” be applied correctly? What is a concept of experience in the phenomenological theory, as well as in philosophy? This polemic paper is an attempt to cover raised issues taking a book “The Phenomenology of Experience” written by Ukrainian philosopher V. Kebuladze as a criticizing benchmark of the polemics. First, the paper highlights a reason of understanding phenomenology as a philosophy beyond empiricism, naturalism and Kantianism. Second, the paper’s author shows why transcendental approach developed by Husserl makes a decisive step to overcome epistemological view on experience, although is not successful to complete that. Third, the article highlights key constituents of any experience: its synthetic function, as well as a related function of transcendence of its factuality. Fourth, the author reconstructs a role of the phenomenological concept of experience as a gained experience of the impossibility of expanding an ideal of completed rationalistic approach. An actual phenomenology of experience is being developed by post-phenomenological thinkers who proceed with understanding transcendental argumentation in a sense of “being-in-the-World” (Heidegger, Gadamer) or takes it as the “embodied agent” (Ch. Taylor). It opens new horizons for both examining and using the notion of experience in contemporary philosophy, including the very phenomenology.
Постійна адреса матеріалу
(2012). Трансцендентальна феноменологія і поняття досвіду . Філософська думка, №5. с. 113-132.