Потойбіч дзеркала: до питання про умови можливості нерефлексійної теорії самосвідомості

Автор(и): Іващенко Іван
Тип матеріалу: Стаття
Мова публікації: українська
Випуск: 2012 №2
Сторінки: 6-29
Abstract: 
The subject of the following paper is to consider what is that we know in cases where we know about ourselves. When we are trying to describe ourselves as the result of self-reflection, we must at the same time acknowledge that the self-consciousness should be reached in the second level acts or that the way of access to the self-knowledge runs through the inner sense (inward-glance). The direct consequence of such assumption is the reification of the self-knowledge. In addition to this consequence we cannot explain, on the one hand, meaningful usage of the first-person perspective, and on the other hand, the link between object knowledge and the second level self-knowledge. The following paper argues that with the self-reflection we cannot describe self-consciousness.The subject of the following paper is to consider what is that we know in cases where we know about ourselves. When we are trying to describe ourselves as the result of self-reflection, we must at the same time acknowledge that the self-consciousness should be reached in the second level acts or that the way of access to the self-knowledge runs through the inner sense (inward-glance). The direct consequence of such assumption is the reification of the self-knowledge. In addition to this consequence we cannot explain, on the one hand, meaningful usage of the first-person perspective, and on the other hand, the link between object knowledge and the second level self-knowledge. The following paper argues that with the self-reflection we cannot describe self-consciousness.
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Постійна адреса матеріалу
http://journal.philosophy.ua/node/6857
Як цитувати
Іващенко Іван (2012). Потойбіч дзеркала: до питання про умови можливості нерефлексійної теорії самосвідомості . Філософська думка, №2. с. 6-29.