The term “epokhe” appeared in ancient philosophy in the context of formation of logical and epistemological procedure of “suspension” towards any question which regards the true character or essence of anything. Arguments against “suspension” raised by Stoics were effectively blocked by representatives of the post-Plato Academy. However, Augustin advanced a new chain of arguments, based on his discovery of the “internal” objects of knowledge against the skeptical “suspension”. In the modern philosophy the image of a skeptic was not generally associated with the act of “suspension”; that is why, when new interest to the procedure of philosophical suspension appeared in philosophy of the 19th and early 20th century, its connection with the heritage of ancient skepticism was either ignored (Mill) or openly denied (Husserl). However, in fact, both Mill’s phenomenalism and Husserl’s phenomenology peculiarly combine the “suspension” towards the true essence of external objects, as the ancient skeptics practised, with thorough analysis of those internal (for the subject) objects of knowledge, whose existence was first postulated by Augustine.